(VI.5.a, p. 228). In this subdivision, Rahner addresses a number of hermeneutical issues, issues about the interpretation of faith in Christ. First, he raises his question. He asks whether the divine self-communication, which he has described in transcendental terms, has actually taken place in the Jesus of history (A). He presupposes that the historical question about Jesus Christ is also a subjective one, for the meaning of Jesus can only be disclosed to faith (B). There is a circular structure of faith in which objective knowledge is combined with a subjective willingness to believe (C). To be sure, our knowledge of Jesus is “interpreted” knowledge. But it is not without objective grounds, for we have Jesus’ own testimony to himself, recorded in the Gospels (D). Although history can be verified only in a relative sense, nevertheless it can have absolute significance (E). It has that significance because we human beings do make absolute commitments. True, we are never absolutely certain about the final wisdom and rightness of what we do. That does not prevent us from making absolute commitments based on contingent knowledge (F).
A. On the Relationship of the Previous Transcendental Inquiry to Historical Events (VI.5.a.A, p. 228). Up to this point, Rahner has asked whether there can be a transcendental idea of God’s self-communication. The transcendental issue differs, however, from the historical. Now he asks the historical question. It is whether this divine self-communication has in fact taken place – and whether it has taken place in Jesus of Nazareth.
B. The Accountability of Our Faith in Jesus as the Christ (VI.5.a.B, p. 229). Rahner does not ask the objective question of Christian theology, “Is Jesus the Christ, and how does he show that he is?” His question is rather a subjective one. He asks, “How do I account for my faith in this Jesus as the Christ?” He asks the subjective question, he says, because he presupposes that his readers have a Western, Christian, and ecclesial faith. His thesis is an interesting one: he wants to show that what is “most objective” (i.e., the nature of Jesus Christ) is also “most subjective” (because it is disclosed to our act of faith).
C. The Circular Structure of Faith Knowledge (VI.5.a.C, p. 230). How does a person who does not believe in Jesus Christ come to faith? First, at a sociological level, says Rahner, that person has an experience. The non-believer experiences himself or herself within a “circle of knowledge,” a circle he or she did not construct alone. So the first stage of faith is a form of socialization: one finds oneself in a society, a “circle of knowledge” about Jesus Christ that is plausible and shared..
Faith in the form of socialization does not mean that one has just accepted faith as a "given," a faith merely presupposed by those within the circle. For the individual must still give an account of the faith and make moral decisions. Although one's knowledge of the faith is incomplete, unreflected, and naive, nevertheless the one who accepts the faith from another is still involved in that faith.
The next stage of faith combines a subjective willingness to believe with the actual ground of the faith. It is the ground of faith, says Rahner, that justifies the willingness to believe. If someone believes my account of Jesus Christ, I have not therefore "produced" the other's faith. I have merely expressed it in a comprehensible way. I have put it in concepts. To those concepts, however, the other has responded. He or she recognizes in the Jesus I preach the one whose grace is already at work.
D. The Historical Dimension of Christian Faith (VI.5.a.D, p. 232). In what sense, and with what right, does the believer assert that the events of Jesus’ life are “historical” (233)? Rahner asks this question because Christians in general (not to mention modern interpreters, such as Wolfhart Pannenberg) claim that faith has a quite definitive historical object. Still, our knowledge of the event of Jesus is not historical in a neutral sense. Rather, it is known through an authoritative interpretation, Jesus’ own interpretation. And it is grasped within the circle of faith.
E. The Problem of the Universal Significance of Particular Historical Events (VI.5.a.E, p. 233). In the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, something absolute has happened for the history of the world. That is the Christian claim. But such a claim runs into a problem, the problem of history. Modern humanity believes that we cannot know the past as well as we know the present. Modern humanity believes that the events of the past are less important than how we respond to them.
There is an incongruity between the merely relative verifiability of historical knowledge and the absolute significance of history. There is "verification" in the study of history, but it is "merely relative." The 18th-century Enlightenment asked whether something historical can be "existientielly" significant. Rahner puts it this way: can salvation be dependent on a historical event, or must it depend on something more verifiable than history?
F. The Inevitable Incongruence Between Relative Historical Certainty and Absolute Commitment (VI.5.a.F, p. 234). Why can we claim that historical events have an “absolute” significance? Because they do have that significance in our real, lived-out existence. We are asked to make absolute commitments throughout our lives. We make them in married life, in the heroism of the battlefield, in religious communities. And we do so in the absence of theoretical certainty. We are never absolutely certain about the final wisdom and rightness of what we do. No matter how thoroughly one tries to weigh a decision, the decision is ultimately made on the basis of a provisional interpretation of reality. That interpretation is finite and historically contingent. Even a decision not to commit oneself can be an absolute decision.
(VI.5.b, p. 235). In this section, Rahner concedes that the NT sources vary in their historical verifiability and reliability. But he insists that an absolute historical verifiability is not only impossible to attain, but unnecessary for faith. True, Jesus understood himself before his death and resurrection in ways that differ from the understanding of the early Church. But these differences are not in contradiction (A). Indeed, one cannot “go behind” the testimony of the first Christian generation to find, in a supposed “historical Jesus,” something significant for theology that has nothing to do with faith (B). It is right and proper, however, to distinguish between an “object” of faith (a truth in which we believe) and a “ground” of faith (a truth for which there is more ample evidence) (C). Secular history may be grasped without faith, yes, but not salvation history (D). Even the earliest Christian witnesses interpreted what they saw with the eyes of faith, just as do Christians today (E). Salvific knowledge is only possible within the context of faith (F). And within faith, one is right to note that some objects of faith are grounds of faith, and some are not (G). Rahner’s goal is to ground Christology in two ways: first, by showing how Jesus himself understood his role: and second, by showing the central role of the resurrection (H).
A. Two Theses (VI.5.b.A, p. 235). There are some (e.g., the followers of Rudolf Bultmann) who will say, “It doesn’t really matter whether the stories of the NT are true; what matters is that, in Jesus Christ, God calls me to love and to obedience in faith.” Rahner rejects this view. He says that Christians must have an abiding interest in the history and self-understanding of Jesus. His life and his death have theological relevance distinct from the relevance of his call to love and obedience. That is the first thesis: the thesis of the relevance of Jesus’ history.
The second thesis is that the Jesus of history and the Jesus of faith are one and the same. To be sure, the accounts of the post-resurrection Jesus are influenced by the faith of the early Christian community. But that does not mean that Jesus' self-understanding before the resurrection contradicts the understanding of him presented by the early Christian community. And our faith does not require that Jesus' self-understanding coincide precisely with the content of our faith today.
Rahner argues this in a clever way. He says that, if Jesus' life before the resurrection coincided unambiguously with the entire content of faith, then there would have been no need for the resurrection. The resurrection then would have been nothing other than God's seal of approval on a faith complete in itself.
B. Christian Faith Refers to the Concrete History of Jesus (VI.5.b.B, p. 236). Research into the historical Jesus can lead to the erroneous conclusion that it is possible, by means of a neutral study of history, to get beyond the testimony of the first witnesses of Jesus. Some researchers believe that they can find something important for faith and for theology wholly apart from what the first Christians believed. But Rahner says that the effort to go beyond the Christ of faith to a Jesus of history is fruitless. Faith alone can decide what, of all that was transmitted in the NT record, is essential to faith. Faith has nothing distinguishable from itself that can be its ground.
Having said that, however, Rahner is at pains to emphasize that transcendentality and existentiality alone cannot ground faith. We cannot possess (in the sense of manipulate) the transcendental and existential experience. We cannot transcend ourselves, nor can we make an existential decision for God, without a reference to real history. And for the Christians of the first century, the historical event of Jesus Christ was the ground of faith.
C. On the Relationship Between the Object and the Ground of Faith (VI.5.b.C, p. 238). Whoever says, “The historical event of Jesus Christ does not make Christian faith legitimate today,” no longer has a traditional Christian faith. In such a person, the relation between faith and its historical ground have been severed. Every ground of faith, says Rahner, is an object of faith. Every miracle, every mighty deed, every selfless sacrifice – everything, in short, that we call a ground of faith – cannot by itself produce faith. These “grounds” of faith are also “objects” of faith, for in them we believe. We believe in them, and hence they undergird our faith.
Not every object of faith, however, is also a ground of faith. Jesus interpreted himself as the absolute saviour, and his self-interpretation is an object of faith in which we believe. But this object of faith (Jesus' self-interpretation) is hard to transmit as a ground of faith. It is easier to proclaim the miracles of Jesus (and preeminently his resurrection) as objects of faith, because these objects also reveal their ground. Miracles ground faith, but not from the outside. It is not as if, once having seen a miracle, we automatically believe. No, the grounds of faith are not extrinsic to faith. It takes faith to see something as a ground of faith.
Historical knowledge grounds faith, but not from the outside. Rahner rejects the idea that the grounds of faith are extrinsic to faith itself. Why? Because faith is not possible without grace. Grace enables a real and effective grasp of the grounds of faith, such as miracles, mighty deeds, resurrection.
D. On the Different Meanings of "History" (VI.5.b.D, p. 240). The discussion of the necessity of faith for recognizing faith’s ground and object enables us to distinguish between two “types” of history. Salvation history is real and objective, but it is grasped only within the assent of faith. The merely historical record of Jesus’ life and death is accessible to knowledge, yes, but it may not be interested in faith.
E. The Faith of the First Witnesses and Our Faith (VI.5.b.E, p. 241). Like us, the first witnesses could only grasp the events of salvation history from within faith. We enter into the structure of the faith of the first witnesses when we, having been given courage by their faith, and believing their testimony, say “I believe.” Their faith, and that of subsequent generations from them to us, has become part of the grounds of our faith. But neither they nor we came to faith by means of experiences apart from faith. The grounds of faith are, from the very beginning, objects of faith.
F. Salvific Knowledge Is Possible Only Within the Commitment of Faith (VI.5.b.F, p. 242). Faith must necessarily be grounded by history. Why? Because salvation must take place in history. The historical object is an “object of faith”; and yet it “grounds” faith. So it must be recognized as what it is: namely, an object in which we believe. This recognition must take place if anything is to have significance.
An object remains insignificant without a faith. Faith recognizes an object in history as an object of faith, and without faith the object has no significance. The ability to recognize such an object for what it is (i.e., an object of faith) differs, however, from grace. We believers may be able to articulate the grounds of our faith. But when we do so, the articulation itself is an act of faith. No one will respond to it unless he or she first has had a transcendental experience of Jesus Christ. The transcendental experience allows one to see events of faith in the events of history.
G. On the Distinction Between Articulations of the Object of Faith and the Ground of Faith (VI.5.b.G, p. 243). We saw earlier (VI.5.b.C) that an object of faith (e.g., Jesus’ self-interpretation as saviour) is not always a ground of faith (like the miracles or the resurrection). Now Rahner goes further: some objects of faith, he says, like the virginal conception of Jesus, do not allow us to grasp the grounds of faith as much as do other objects of faith. Such objects, like Jesus’ miracles, are not just objects but also grounds of faith.
Even for someone with faith it is not always possible to differentiate, by means of history, between object and ground. Some texts offer only an object of faith, not a ground of faith. Historically speaking, we want to establish with certainty what we can about those objects of faith which are also grounds of faith. Texts significant for dogmatic theology (e.g., texts about the virginal conception) are sometimes different texts from those significant for fundamental theology. Yet both are seen from within faith.
The believer is justified in distinguishing between the "minimum" of secure knowledge about the history of Jesus and other, less secure items of knowledge. These less secure "objects of faith" are true but they go beyond the substance of the NT. The "minimum" items of knowledge, by contrast, are not only "objects" of faith but also "grounds." In the past, we have judged the "objects" which go beyond the substance of the NT (e.g., those which are not also "grounds," such as the virginal conception) too generously.
H. The Minimal Historical Presuppositions of an Orthodox Christology to Be Established by Fundamental Theology (VI.5.b.H, p. 245). Fundamental theology need only prove that two theses are credible in order to establish the grounds of faith for Christology. One thesis is that Jesus understood himself, not merely as one in a line of prophets, but as the eschatological prophet, i.e., the absolute saviour. The second thesis is that the resurrection of Jesus Christ is credible and mediates the saviour in his total reality.
In fundamental theology, one does not have to prove that each and every detail of the NT record is reliable. Yes, it is "Catholic" to assert that the NT is inerrant. But the judgment about the historical value of the various NT sources is different from inerrancy. We need to make distinctions among the NT sources and their historically verifiable reliability.
(VI.5.c, p. 246). In this subdivision, Rahner acknowledges that his Foundations do not pretend to be a work of Scriptural exegesis (A). But the Foundations are built upon the results of exegesis, and Rahner presents the essential elements in the historical knowledge of Jesus (B).
A. The Nature of Our Procedure (VI.5.c, p. 246). In this subdivision, Rahner acknowledges that his Foundations do not pretend to be a work of Scriptural exegesis (A). But the Foundations are built upon the results of exegesis, and Rahner presents the essential elements in the historical knowledge of Jesus (B).
B. A Summary in Thesis Form (VI.5.c.b, p. 247). Rahner lists and describes six essential elements in the historical knowledge of Jesus. The first is that Jesus intended to be a religious reformer, not a revolutionary. He was a member of his community’s religious culture. The second is that Jesus was a radical reformer who broke the lordship of the law that had put itself in place of God. The third is that Jesus hoped at first for a victory in his religious mission. Gradually, however, he realized his mission was bringing him into mortal conflict with society. The fourth element is that Jesus accepted his death as the consequence of his fidelity to his mission and as imposed on him by God. The fifth element is that Jesus called for people to be converted due to the closeness of God’s kingdom, a conversion that had political consequences. Such conversion did not require, however, that the only way to live discipleship was to be involved with the underprivileged and outcasts. The sixth element and the one above all others, says Rahner, is that we cannot decide a number of historical questions about Jesus. For example, we cannot speak definitively about his consciousness of his divine Sonship, about the titles he used for himself, about the extent to which he believed that his death would have a saving consequence, and about whether he foresaw that his disciples would form a new community (even if we can say that he did found the Church).
(VI.5.d, p. 249). Rahner begins this sub-division by emphasizing the difference between the human and the divine natures in Jesus Christ (A). He notes that, although many say that Jesus was “mistaken” in expecting the immediate coming of the Kingdom of God, nevertheless a truly human Jesus could not have predicted the future. What Jesus was expressing, Rahner says, was his closeness to the Father (B). The function of Jesus was to proclaim the kingdom, Rahner says, and this function was also the essence of the divine Word (C). Jesus was not just the proclaimer of a message. He believed that, in his very person, the message of God had become incarnate (D).
A. The Truly Human Self-Consciousness of Jesus (VI.5.d.A, p. 249). The human self-consciousness of Jesus was not “of one nature” with the consciousness of the divine Logos. The man Jesus was not a mere puppet or mouthpiece of the divine Word. On the contrary, Jesus (1) stood at a created distance from the divine in his freedom, obedience, and in worship; and he (2) had to learn, to grow in wisdom, and to suffer disappointment that God’s kingdom did not arrive in the way he thought it would.
Rahner's way of explaining this is to say that Jesus' self-consciousness had a history. Unlike the consciousness of the divine Word, Jesus's self-consciousness was not unchangeable. The two consciousnesses were different. That is why Christians were later to declare that Jesus Christ is one divine Person with two natures.
B. The Problem of the "Imminent Expectation" (VI.5.d.B, p. 249). Jesus spoke of his relation with God by means of apocalyptic language. His language implied “an imminent expectation and an eschatology of the present.” In striking words and images, Jesus denied that there is a time between the arrival of God’s kingdom and the present. But because Jesus spoke of the coming of the kingdom as “soon,” and because he did not reconcile that “soon” with his affirmation that no one knows “the hour,” many speak of an error in Jesus’ expectation. They think that Jesus was mistaken.
But there is no reason to speak of an error, says Rahner, since a genuinely human consciousness must have an unknown future. Jesus' imminent expectation was the truest way he could express his closeness to God, a closeness which called for an unconditional decision. It was the decision to accept God's closeness and live by it, or not.
C. Jesus' Message about God's Kingdom as the Definitive Proclamation of Salvation (VI.5.d.C, p. 250). Jesus proclaimed that God offers salvation here and now, says Rahner, and that God has decided for the freedom of human beings by means of the Incarnation. In other words, God wants to “save” humanity and wants us to choose that salvation freely. God does not harmonize into a readily grasped system the desire for human freedom and the will to create a kingdom of grace for sinners. The two exist in tension.
Jesus proclaimed the kingdom of God, and not himself. His function (i.e., to proclaim the kingdom) is his essence, his essence as divine Word. His arrival is the arrival of the kingdom. Before Jesus, the offer of God's salvation was not irreversible. God had not made his offer in a definitive way. After the death and resurrection, a new situation for decision is present. This situation was and is true for us, even though for us it is a brief situation for decision. It is no longer than our lives are long.
D. The Connection Between the Message and the Person of Jesus (VI.5.d.D, p. 251). The Jesus of the synoptic gospels proclaimed that the last judgment of human beings by God is dependent on their decision regarding Jesus’ own person. He implied that he “is” the closeness of God’s kingdom. The coming of the kingdom, said Jesus, is identical to his own coming and person.
For some, it is impossible to ascribe to Jesus the status of one who achieved victory in death. Why impossible? Because the message of Jesus, they believe, is no different from the message of any other prophet. Such a message, they say is independent of Jesus' own person (as were the messages of, say, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel). The message lives on despite the fate of the prophet, and does not depend on the prophet's success or failure.
If Jesus' message were independent of his person, it would be impossible to ascribe to Jesus alone a "victory in death." But was his message really independent of his person? Rahner says no. "The pre-resurrection Jesus thought that this new closeness of the kingdom came to be in and through the totality of what he said and what he did" (252). True, the focus of his preaching was the kingdom, not himself. But it is no less true that he identified the kingdom and himself before his death and resurrection.
Jesus believed and knew himself to be the final call of God. In Jesus, God promises the divine self (253). Yes, Jesus' relation to God was unique in comparison to other human beings. But because it was unique, he was an example to us. We are to follow him. We are invited to have the same relation to God that Jesus had.
Did Jesus know himself, however, to be God's final call before his death and resurrection? Rahner said earlier (p. 235) that the resurrection added something unique to the content of faith, and that the content was not complete prior to the resurrection. But here he says that Jesus knew himself, before the resurrection, to be the final call of God. He asserts that Jesus "could have" known and experienced himself as absolute saviour before his crucifixion. Jesus knew in himself "that radical and victorious offer of God"; and further, he knew that God's offer to him "is significant, valid and irrevocable for all men" (p. 254).
(VI.5.e, p. 254). In this brief section of Part 5, Rahner asserts (1) that Jesus met his death freely and understood it “at least” as the fate of a prophet; (2) that the meaning of his fate was “hidden in the intention of God,” an intention known to Jesus as “a forgiving closeness to the world”; and (3) that one can leave open the question of whether Jesus understood his death explicitly as an “expiatory sacrifice.” To be sure, Jesus’ death is atonement for sins. By sending Jesus, the Father expressed his salvific will for all human beings. In that sense, Jesus’ life and death achieved an atonement or reconciliation willed by God. But Jesus understood this concept, Rahner argues, in terms of a unique claim. It was the claim of an identity between his message and his person. He understood that “in this death he will be vindicated by God with regard to his claim” (255). The idea of an expiatory sacrifice should not be understood as changing the mind of an angry God, as if God did not intend human salvation before the death of Jesus.
(VI.5.f, p. 255). Jesus was a miracle-worker, and Rahner poses a question about the significance of the miracles for our faith (A). The Church presents the miracles of Jesus as a justification of Jesus’ claims, but modern people often see the miracles as mere stories that reflect a pre-rational view of the world (B). A proper understanding of miracles, however, requires that they be seen as signs which disclose a particular truth and which are addressed to a particular person or group (C). While it may be true to say that miracles interrupt the so-called laws of nature, it would be better to say that we do not fully understand these “laws,” and that the laws of biology and matter are integrated into the spiritual in ways we do not fully comprehend (D). A better understanding of miracles regards them as material signs of an experience that would be better described as spiritual. The experience of miracles depends on the spiritual receptivity of the participant (E). Miracles are a “call” from God, a call that may come through wonders or through the most ordinary means, a call that invites faith (F). The greatest miracle is the resurrection. It is well attested, a “ground” (and not just an object) of faith, and the validation of Jesus’ life (G).
A. Questions on the Importance of the Miracles of Jesus for Our Relationship to Him in Faith (VI.5.f.A, p. 255). Rahner starts with the assumption that Jesus was a miracle worker, and that Jesus perceived in his miracles a sign that a new closeness to God’s kingdom was being brought about in his person. Given that assumption, Rahner asks what is the significance of miracles for our faith. He poses three questions:
1. If historical criticism rightly shows that the miracle stories have been embellished, then what is left of these miracles?
2. Once we have seen what is left of the miracle stories, then how are we to interpret them (knowing from modern science, for example, that sudden cures do not have to be seen as miracles worked directly by God)?
3. Do the miracles have a function that can be called indispensable in making the claims of Jesus legitimate?
B. Official Church Teaching and the Contemporary Horizon of Understanding (VI.5.f.B, p. 256). The tradition of the Church says that the claim of Jesus as the definitive arrival of God’s kingdom is made legitimate by his miracles and resurrection. Vatican I’s Dei filius obliges us to regard the miracles as a cogent justification of Jesus’ claim, although not apart from the resurrection (which may be understood as one of the miracles). But this tradition of the Church raises a stumbling block for some people. It is easier to acknowledge the resurrection as an object of faith than to see it as a ground of faith (see above, p. 238 and 243). Many people simply do not understand what a miracle is supposed to be. They see it as a mythological expression that does not fit with a rational view of the world. Still other people do not understand the relation between the miracles in general and the miracle of resurrection. In the NT, the miracles are used to portray Jesus and his life. But the resurrection is the greatest of the miracles, and had a unique place in the apostolic preaching.
C. On the General Notion of Miracle (VI.5.f.C, p. 257). Miracles are not extrinsic to the reality they witness to. They confirm the reality. Indeed, says Rahner, a miracle is dependent on and conditioned by what it is supposed to disclose. Moreover, miracles vary according to what they are meant to show. Each discloses a distinctive aspect of God’s salvific activity. Finally, miracles are addressed to a person. “They are not facta bruta,” says Rahner, “but an address to a knowing subject in a quite definite historical situation” (258). It is absurd to define all miracles as God’s effort to correct the course of the world. God did not make a mistake that then had to be put right by a miracle.
D. Miracles and the Laws of Nature (VI.5.f.D, p. 258). Rahner concedes that miracles are an interruption in the laws of nature, if by that we simply mean that God exists in sovereign freedom and omnipotence. No “laws” can bind God. But problems arise if we regard miracles as interruptions in the laws of nature. It is hard to show certainly and positively that the laws of nature have been suspended. So Rahner asks: can we do without the idea of suspending the laws of nature?
Rahner thinks we can. First, he says, we must admit that the laws of nature are not fully comprehensible. We are accustomed to think that the laws of nature govern the "lower dimensions" of matter and biology. We assume that the "higher dimensions" of freedom and spirit are different. But Rahner states that there is a continuum between the lower and the higher. Matter and biology are one in being with freedom and spirit, and they are "open to" each other. The lower dimensions can be "subsumed into" freedom. And when that happens, their fundamental structures are not altered but expanded.
For this reason, the world of matter and biology can manifest the world of freedom, history, and spirit. The "lower" is integrated with the "higher," and does not thereby lose its own laws and structure. Moreover, the meaning of the human spirit cannot be derived from the material and the biological. Human spirit takes the material and biological into its service.
To read the remainder of this text, please order the printed version of The Foundations of Karl Rahner by Mark F. Fischer, published in 2005 by Crossroad Publishing (ISBN 0824523423).
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